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Abstract
Previous studies of the effects of stock trading on prices consider an
individual trade as the basic unit of analysis. Since many institutional
investors' orders are broken up into several trades, the usual approach to
measuring price impact or execution cost based on individual trades may be
biased. Instead, this paper uses the record of all trades executed by 37 large
investment management firms from July 1986 to December 1988 to study the price
impact and execution cost of the entire sequence ("package'') of trades
constituting an order. We analyze the importance of firm capitalization,
package size and the management firm's identity as determinants of market impact
and trading cost.

Financial economists have long been preoccupied with the equity trading
process and its impact on stock prices. Much prior empirical research isolates
individual trades and analyzes the behavior of the stock price around each
trade. An incomplete list of such research includes Kraus and Stoll (1972),
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987, 1990), Keim and Madhavan (1991), Chan and
Lakonishok (1993), Hausman, Lo and MacKinlay (1992) and Petersen and Umlauf
(1991). Evaluating the behavior of stock prices around trades provides a means
of discriminating between various hypotheses as to the elasticity of the demand
for stocks; yields an estimate of the cost of executing trades and a measure of
the liquidity of a market; and permits tests of different models of the
determination of quotes and transaction prices.
It is often misleading, however, to consider an individual trade as the
basic unit of analysis in the study of trading activity and its effects on
prices. For many institutional investors, even a moderately-sized position in a
stock may represent a large fraction of the stock's trading volume. It is quite
common, for instance, for an active investment management firm to have half a
billion dollars invested in equities allocated across fifty stocks. Each
position in a stock thus represents an investment of roughly ten million
dollars. On the other hand, a typical company in the bottom tier of the S&P500
has daily trading volume of about $2.5 million. An institutional investor
wishing to establish a position in a stock would thus have to take up several
days' worth of daily volume in the stock. Accordingly, an investment manager's
buy or sell order is often broken up into several trades.
Several reasons could account for such order-splitting behavior. If
markets are not perfectly liquid, even an uninformed trader may choose to
execute an order in a piecemeal fashion, in order to avoid large transitory
disruptions in the stock price. Bodurtha and Quinn (1990) provide a case study
of such a trading strategy. Kyle (1985), Easley and O'Hara (1987) suggest that
informed speculators break their trades up into smaller orders, so as to
camouflage themselves as uninformed investors and thereby overcome the adverse
selection problem.
Given such order-splitting, therefore, it is only meaningful to study the
behavior of stock prices around institutional transactions in the broader
context of the entire sequence (or "package") of trades constituting the order.
The methodology commonly used in the existing literature, however, ignores the
fact that each trade is part of a larger package. For example, in measuring the
market impact of a block trade the price at which the trade is executed is
compared to some benchmark price, typically measured on the trade date. This
fails to recognize, however, that the benchmark price itself might be affected
by other trades from the same order (or by other investors' trades). The same
procedure for measuring market impact is also commonly used to measure the cost
of executing trades. Again, however, the drawback is that different parts of
the same order are being compared to different benchmark prices. Suppose, for
example, that we are evaluating the execution performance of an investment
manager by comparing each of his trades with some benchmark price on the trade
day. If this manager trades several times or on several days, but is able to
capture the benchmark price on every trade, we would judge this manager to have
zero execution cost and his trades have no price impact. However, the manager's
buying pressure could be pushing up the price of the stock over the course of
the package. In fact, he may actually be incurring substantial execution cost
if his trade prices were compared to a benchmark price from before the
initiation of the package. Similarly, comparing prices from before the package
with prices after the package ends may reveal a large price impact. Such price
impact might not be detected if each trade is treated in isolation and compared
to its own benchmark. It is thus necessary to examine the price impact or
execution cost of the trade package as a whole.
This paper performs just such an examination. Ideally, one would like
information on investors' orders (including those unfilled as well as those
actually executed) , and information on market conditions at the time when the
investment decision is made. Such information, however, is well-nigh impossible
to obtain. Instead, this paper uses the next best alternative, namely, the
record of trades executed by a sample of 37 large investment management firms.
This trading history allows us to identify cases where the same investment
manager is in the market for a stock (buying or selling) over the course of
several trades within the same day, or over several days. We examine the price
3impact of institutional trading packages. The behavior of prices before the
initiation of the trading program, as well as the subsequent performance of the
stock, are also discussed. The prior behavior of prices allows us to address
such issues as whether the behavior of institutional investors is potentially
destabilizing, insofar as they tend to chase price trends, or whether they tend
to reduce short-term swings by trading in a contrarian manner against prior
price movements. Similarly, the returns subsequent to the package provide clues
as to whether our sample of investment managers has any superior short-run
information. We also provide evidence on the costs of executing trades, using a
variety of benchmark prices. Finally, we analyze how our various measures of
price impact and execution costs are related to firm capitalization, the
relative size of the trade package ("trade complexity"), and the identity of the
investment manager undertaking the trades.
There are, of course, many more aspects to the trade execution process,
beyond just how an order is split up, that may influence the impact on prices.
Typically, a large investment management firm has a trading desk, responsible
for order execution. An order may also be accompanied by more or less detailed
instructions from the investment manager to the desk as to how the order is to
be filled. For example, a value-oriented manager will typically give much
leeway to the trading desk, since urgency is not considered critical. A' manager
following a strategy based on short-term price momentum, on the other hand, will
insist on speedy execution. The instructions to the trading desk will, to a
greater or lesser degree, constrain the desk's ability to trade strategically in
such a way as to reduce execution cost. Within these constraints, the desk has
flexibility in choosing which and how many brokers to employ; the time frame
within which the order is to be executed; and how the trade is to be brought to
the floor—as a market order, limit order or whether a floor broker is to work
the order, for example. In general, all these aspects of the trading process
will affect the price impact or execution cost of the trade. Our results for
price impact and execution cost are therefore best interpreted as averages
across a large number of trades made by managers with many different investment
styles and many different trading strategies. At the same time, these
4considerations also suggest that a study of the differences across institutional
investment managers with respect to their price impact or costs should provide
clues as to the importance of investment style and trading strategy.
We find that multi-day trade packages make up a very substantial portion
of institutional trading—more than half of the dollar value traded in our
sample takes four or more days for execution. Such order-splitting behavior on
the part of a group of large, sophisticated investors provides strong prima
facie evidence that the demand curve for stocks is not always perfectly elastic.
Indeed, the price impact associated with trade packages is quite sizeable: the
average price change (weighted by the dollar size of the trade) from the open on
the package's first day to the close on the last day is almost 1 percent for
buys, and -0.35 percent for sells. The overall impact of buys and sells is
asymmetric: prices stay high after purchases, but there is a relatively
stronger price reversal after sales.
We also provide evidence on the controversial issue of the execution cost
of institutional trading. The dollar-weighted round-trip cost relative to the
first opening price of a package is 1.32 percent (or forty-nine cents per
share); relative to the closing price five days after the package's completion,
the dollar-weighted round-trip cost is 0.08 percent (three cents per share),
commission costs are 0.19 percent (seven cents per share).
The price impact and execution cost of packages are related to the
capitalization of the stock traded and to relative trade size (complexity), as
suggested in prior theoretical and empirical research. However, the most
dominant influence is the identity of the money management firm undertaking the
package. Some preliminary evidence suggests that differences across money
managers stem mainly from their demands for immediacy in execution. We find
that more impatient managers (those following a growth-oriented strategy, or
with higher turnover rates, or executing shorter packages) incur larger price
impact and execution cost.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a discussion of
the characteristics of our sample in section I, the behavior of stock prices
around institutional trade packages is analyzed in section II. Section III
provides several measures of the market impact cost of trade packages. In the
subsequent sections we investigate the importance of various determinants of
price impact and execution cost-firm size and trade complexity (section IV), and
the identity of the money management firm undertaking the trade (section V).
Regression results are presented in section VI, together with some preliminary
evidence on the cost of immediacy. A final section contains the conclusions.
I . PRELIMINARIES
A . Data
Our data set records the transactions made by each of 37 large investment
management firms from July 1986 until the end of 1988. The trades, both small
and large, involve issues listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges.
In total, there are roughly 1.2 million trades, accounting for about 5 percent
of the total value of trading on the two exchanges over this period. For each
transaction, the stock's CUSIP number, the trade date, trade price, number of
shares and dollar commissions are recorded. In addition, each trade is
identified as a purchase or sale by the investment manager, who in turn is also
identified by a numeric code (although the name of the management firm is not
disclosed to us) . These data are collected by the transaction cost measurement
service of SEI Corp. , a large consulting organization in the area of financial
services for institutional investors. These data are supplemented by
transaction data from tapes supplied by the Francis Emory Fitch Company, and
also by data on returns and capitalization from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.
Several features of our data set represent improvements over previous
studies of the price impact of trades. The sample is much larger and covers a
more recent period than many previous studies. Each trade is explicitly
identified as a purchase or sale by the investment manager, so that it is not
necessary to infer trade direction from the prior behavior of prices (as under
the "tick test" used in previous studies, and described by Lee and Ready
(1991)). The investment manager associated with each trade is also known. The
6sample includes a relatively large number of such investment managers, with a
variety of different investment styles and trading strategies.
We use each manager's trading history to reconstruct the manager's trading
programs in each stock. In particular, we define a "buy package" to be a case
where the same manager carries out successive purchases of the same stock; a buy
package ends when the manager stays out of the market for the stock for a
specified period of time. We choose a five-day break to end a package, although
we also replicated the results with packages defined by shorter gaps in trading.
"Sell packages" are defined similarly. To illustrate, suppose a manager buys a
stock for three days in succession and then, after a one-day gap, engages in
another buy transaction in the same stock. Suppose also that there are no
further trades in this stock by this manager. Under a one-day gap definition of
a package, the first three days' purchases would constitute a buy package, while
the last day's trades would make up another buy package. Under a five-day gap
definition of a package, all of these trades would be considered as part of one
buy package.
B. Summary Statistics for Packages
Applying the five-day gap definition of a package to our sample yields
155,789 packages with a total trade principal value of roughly 187 billion
dollars. This is a much larger sample than those employed in previous studies.
Table I reports the frequency distribution of trade packages by package length
(the number of days within the package on which trades occurred). Panel A
describes the results for purchases while panel B provides the results for
sales. In each panel, we report the frequency distribution for all trades and
also for each of five groups classified by the market value at the end of each
quarter of the outstanding equity of the underlying stock. The size
classification is based on the quintiles of the size distribution of all NYSE
and AMEX stocks.
Previous studies have treated each trade in isolation. From panel A of
Table I, however, such transactions make up only 12.9 percent of the dollar
value of all purchases. Indeed, in terms of the value of institutional
purchases, only about 20 percent is completed within a day, while as much as
53.2 percent takes four or more days of trading to be completed. Note that,
under our definitions, while the length of a package may be, say, five days
(meaning that the manager traded on five days from the start to the finish of a
package), the number of days elapsed from the package's beginning to its end
could be much longer. This is because each day of trading in the package could
be followed by a pause of up to four days. Isolated sell transactions make up
only 14.4 percent of the value of institutional sales and only about 22 percent
of the value of sells is completed in one day; on the other hand, programs
taking four or more days account for about half of the value of institutional
sales. It is evident, therefore, that focussing on individual transactions, as
previous studies have done, provides only a very narrow view of the way in which
institutions actually trade, and may yield a very distorted picture of the
market impact or execution cost of institutional trades.
The finding that institutional trades are stretched out over several days
is consistent with the idea that institutions strategically break their orders
up into smaller trades, so as to avoid large market impact in illiquid markets
or to avoid the adverse selection problem. Further, the trading desk may choose
to break off its trading temporarily if it finds the stock price unacceptable
(depending on the constraints imposed by the manager) . Alternatively, while a
trading package is underway the manager may revise the original order, so that
the observed package may not exactly correspond to the manager's intentions at
the time the package was initiated.
The bulk of most institutional purchases and sales is concentrated in the
20 percent of stocks with the highest capitalization. This group makes up
roughly 52 percent (59 percent) of the number of buy (sell) packages, or about
77 percent (78 percent) of the value of buy (sell) packages. The smallest
40 percent of firms by market capitalization, in contrast, make up only
10 percent (5 percent) of the number of buys (sells), and only about 1 percent
of the dollar value of either buys or sells. While one might expect that
institutional trades in smaller firms take longer to complete, Table I suggests
otherwise for both buys and sells— if anything, packages in the smaller
8companies take fewer days from first trade to last trade, at least in terms of
the distribution of dollar value by package length, than packages in the larger
companies. This finding, however, may be due to differences in managers'
investment styles and trading strategies across size groups. 1
We also replicated Table 1 for the frequency distribution of packages
under a one-day gap definition of a package. About a quarter of the principal
value of packages runs four days or longer when the one-day gap definition is
used, compared to about half when a five-day gap definition is used. This
comparison suggests that it is quite common for institutional trading in a stock
to be interrupted by pauses, even in the midst of a package. The existence of
such lengthy pauses even while a trading package is underway further highlights
the pitfalls in analyzing each transaction in isolation.
Table II describes other characteristics of packages (using a five-day gap
definition) . Panel A provides statistics on the number of shares traded per
package. It perhaps comes as no surprise that packages are larger than
individual trades—the mean number of shares traded is 35,300 and 36,200 shares
for buy and sell packages, respectively. In contrast, the average number of
shares traded in a single institutional transaction is less than 10,000 shares
(Chan and Lakonishok (1993)). In the extreme, the largest 1 percent of packages
exceed 450,000 shares.
The size of a package tends to increase with firm size, perhaps reflecting
the differential liquidity in the market for large versus small firms. However,
there is no overall tendency for buy and sell packages to differ with respect to
the number of shares traded, despite the finding of Chan and Lakonishok (1993)
that sell transactions tend to be larger than buy transactions. One reason for
this might be that a package corresponds more closely to an order. There is no
reason to suppose that buy and sell orders should differ in size, even though
they may be broken up differently into individual trades insofar as buys and
sells differ with respect to their execution cost.
Panel B presents the distribution of the dollar value of packages. The
mean value of a package is roughly $1.2 million. However, there are some very
large packages (the top 1 percent of packages are in excess of $16 million) and
9the distribution is highly skewed. Indeed, the largest 25 percent of packages
by dollar principal account for approximately 75 percent of the total dollar
value. In panel C, package size is measured relative to normal daily trading
volume. Normal daily volume is computed as the average daily volume over a
prior 40-day interval. An institutional package generally represents a
substantial portion of normal daily volume—the averages are 0.66 and 0.61 for
buys and sells respectively, while the medians are smaller (0.11 and 0.07).
Even in the largest firms, an average package takes up 25 percent of normal
daily volume, while an average package in the smallest firms is two or three
times daily volume. In the extreme, the largest packages are many times larger
than normal daily volume in the stock. These statistics illustrate how illiquid
the market can be, even in the largest stocks, from the perspective of large
institutional investors.
II. THE PRICE IMPACT OF TRADE PACKAGES
In this section, we provide evidence on the behavior of stock prices
around institutional packages. Our measures of price behavior adjust for
market-wide stock price movements, as reflected in the returns on similarly-
sized firms. At the beginning of every quarter, we divide all NYSE and Amex
stocks into deciles, based on market capitalization. Since we focus on short-
term price movements, the returns are not likely to be large. Hence it is
important not to contaminate the measurement of returns with biases in the size-
adjustment procedure. One such bias would arise if it were assumed that the
size control portfolio were rebalanced daily (Blume and Stambaugh (1983)).
Instead, for each day in the sample period, we compute buy-and-hold returns on
each of the ten decile portfolios, for a number of different holding periods,
ranging from one to thirty days in length. Each stock traded in our sample is
assigned its corresponding control decile portfolio, based on its market value
of equity outstanding at the beginning of the quarter. In the subsequent
analysis, we measure returns in excess of the return on the control decile
portfolio over the relevant holding period.
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Table III provides summary statistics on stock price behavior around trade
packages, for both buy and sell programs (see also Figure 1). Our focus is on
excess returns averaged across all packages, using the dollar value of the
package as weights (hereafter denoted the principal-weighted average).
On a principal-weighted average basis, institutional money managers tend
to buy stocks that have risen in price. In the twenty-day period preceding buy
packages, there is a sizeable principal-weighted return of 0.86 percent. Much
of this increase occurs before the five- day period immediately preceding
purchases. This price appreciation could be indicative of short-term positive
feedback trading behavior ("trend-chasing"), in the sense that increases in the
stock price trigger trading. Alternatively, money managers could be trading in
the wake of news events such as earnings announcements. Another possibility is
that managers tend to focus on the same stocks, but they may have different lag
times before they actually begin trading. Hence, on average, by the time one
institutional investor begins buying, other institutions will already have
entered the market, and perhaps will have pushed the price up already. There is
evidence, however, that the price increase beforehand is mainly associated with
the larger packages. The simple mean return in the twenty-day period prior to
buys is -0.18 percent. It may be the case that a manager requires a stronger
confirmation (higher return) before initiating large buys, or it may be possible
that larger trades are undertaken by managers who follow price momentum.
Buy packages are associated with some pressure on prices. On a principal-
weighted average basis, the first day's trade price is 0.33 percent above the
opening price. The rise on the first day amounts to roughly twelve cents (one
tick), given the average stock price of $36.50 in our sample. By the close on
the last day of the package, the price is 0.98 percent higher than the opening
price on the first day of the package (after adjusting for movements in the
price of similarly-sized stocks). The simple mean excess returns, however, are
much smaller—the mean excess return from the opening price to the first day's
trade price is 0.11 percent, while the mean excess return from the first open to
the last close is 0.39 percent. The price increase over the course of a buy
package is consistent with a variety of explanations. As in the preceding
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discussion, managers could be acting in a positive-feedback manner or they may
be "herding." Alternatively, they could be trading on favorable private
information, which is gradually revealed over the course of the package. The
liquidity effects of the increased short-term demand for the stock, and perhaps
imperfect substitution between stocks in the long run, could also account for
the price pressure from buy packages.
If short-term liquidity effects are the source of the price pressure, then
there should be a reversal in the stock price after the package ends. In
panel A, however, there is only limited evidence of a price reversal immediately
after the package. The principal-weighted average return from the close on the
last day of the package to the close one day afterwards is positive
(0.03 percent), so that the price continues to rise a day after a package.
Extending the returns out to five days after the completion of a package yields
a reversal of only -0.07 percent. Accordingly, the price stays at the new
higher level so that the price change appears to be permanent.
Our sample of investment managers does not appear to have any superior
predictive ability with respect to short-term price movements, however. The
stocks that they purchase experience average abnormal returns of only
0.05 percent in the twenty-day period following the completion of the package.
This finding is consistent with related evidence (Fama (1991), Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny (1992)), that professional investors do not display superior
performance over longer horizons and over longer sample periods.
Given the evidence in panel A that money managers buy stocks that have
risen in price, do they also sell stocks that suffer price declines? The
results in panel B for sell packages suggest otherwise: prices also tend to
rise in advance of sells, although the principal-weighted average return of
0.38 percent in this case is less than that for buys. The positive return prior
to sell packages is consistent with evidence that volume (and hence both buying
and selling activity) tends to rise after increases in the stock price
(Lakonishok and Smidt (1986)). From the first to the last day of a sell
package, the price falls by 0.22 percent. The same factors as in the case of
buy packages could account for the price movement over the course of a sell
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package. After the completion of a sell package, however, the price partially
recovers. The reversal occurs as early as the last day of the package: the
return from the average price of the last day's trades to the closing price that
day is 0.11 percent, with a further reversal of 0.12 percent one day after the
package ends. Our sample of money managers appears to be as unsuccessful in
predicting price changes in the period following sales as they are in predicting
returns after purchases.
In sum, when institutional trades are analyzed not singly but in terms of
packages, purchases are associated with a price change of almost 1 percent from
the open on the package's first day to the close on the last day. The
corresponding price change of -0.35 percent for sell packages is less dramatic,
but still sizeable. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) follow the conventional
methodology in studying price impact and measure price changes around each
institutional transaction. They find a much smaller return from the open on the
trade date to the same day's close—0.34 percent in the case of buys and
-0.04 percent for sells. The conventional methodology's use of benchmark prices
from around the time of the trade, however, fails to recognize that in most
cases an institutional investor is in the market for a stock several days at a
time.
The behavior of prices after purchases and after sales displays an
intriguing asymmetry, as noted earlier by Kraus and Stoll (1972), Holthausen,
Leftwich and Mayers (1987, 1990), Keim and Madhavan (1991), Chan and Lakonishok
(1993). Purchases are accompanied by an increase in the stock price with little
sign of subsequent reversal; while sales are associated with a price decline,
the price recovers afterwards, although not fully. Chan and Lakonishok (1993)
review two conjectures as to the sources of the asymmetry. Compared to a
purchase, a sale is more likely to be intermediated through a broker or dealer,
who is able to hold the stock in inventory. An intermediary is less likely to
be involved in a purchase, to the extent that a broker-dealer may not have the
stock in inventory, and is generally less willing to enter a short position to
accommodate a buyer. The temporary, self-correcting, price concession
associated with a sale represents compensation to the intermediary under this
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first argument. A second possibility is that purchases represent stronger
signals of private information than sales. Since a money manager can always
invest in a diversified portfolio, the decision to select a particular issue for
purchase may be interpreted as a strong signal of favorable firm-specific
private information. Further, a larger purchase may imply more favorable
beliefs (and hence a larger price change) than a smaller purchase, thus
potentially accounting for the difference between the simple mean returns and
the principal-weighted returns for buys. In contrast, the choice of a stock to
sell might be related to more mechanical reasons with no information content.
Instead, the stock might already have achieved the manager's pre-set goals and
is liquidated to finance new purchases. If larger sales are no more informative
than small sales, there should not be notable differences between the principal-
weighted and simple mean returns— indeed, the principal-weighted average and
simple mean returns are generally more similar for sells than for buys.
III. THE EXECUTION COST OF INSTITUTIONAL TRADE PACKAGES
The cost' of equity trading is a particularly controversial issue. Many
studies find that portfolio managers are unable to match the performance of
various passive benchmarks (Brinson, Singer and Beebower (1991), Fama (1991),
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992)). The lackluster performance of
professional money managers could be due, at least in part, to market impact
costs.
Table IV provides measures of the market impact and commission cost of
institutional trades (see Figure 2). One commonly-used cost measure is reported
in Table IV: for each transaction in a package, we calculate the return from
the volume-weighted average of prices on the trade date to the trade price. The
cost for a package is the weighted average (using trade principal as weights)
across all trades in the package. A positive (negative) return would signify a
cost for buys (sells). Under this cost measure, institutional purchases and
sales are accommodated at virtually no cost: the cost is 0.03 percent and
0.05 percent for buys and sells, respectively. From this perspective, market
impact costs are dwarfed by the average commission cost of 0.19 percent.
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Table III, however, suggests that there are sizeable price movements even
as successive parts of the same package are being executed. Employing a
different benchmark price for each trade in a package is thus tantamount to
using a shifting baseline to measure the cost of an adjustment to an
institution's portfolio. Accordingly, the cost relative to the same-day volume-
weighted average price misstates the market impact cost of institutional trades.
Table IV presents three other cost measures, where each trade in a package is
compared to a fixed benchmark price taken from either before or after the
package.
The first of these measures uses the opening price on the first day of a
package as the fixed benchmark. If the portfolio manager's trading intentions
were known at the beginning of the first trading day, the price at the opening
auction could have been captured (at least for small trades). Indeed,
conversations with money managers suggest that in many cases the investment
decision has already been made by the open on the first day: many
quantitatively-oriented managers, for example, will have in hand by the open the
overnight results from their computerized investment models. We calculate the
return from the benchmark to each trade in the package (adjusting for the
holding period return on the size control portfolio), and average these excess
returns across all trades in the package, using trade principal values as
weights. This is equivalent to calculating the principal-weighted average price
of all trades in the package, and then measuring the return from the benchmark
to this average price; this return is then adjusted for price movements in
similarly-sized firms. Note that a positive return from the open to the package
corresponds to a cost for purchases (since the stock is bought at a principal-
weighted average price above the opening price), while a negative return
corresponds to a cost for sales (since the stock is sold at a price below the
opening)
.
Instead of using a benchmark price from before the package, a benchmark
price can also be taken from the period after a package ends, once the temporary
price pressure from the package has eased. Beebower and Priest (1980) adopt
this approach. Since the post-execution benchmark is not established until
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after a package has ended, it has the added virtue that it cannot be easily
"gamed." If, on the other hand, traders are being evaluated against a benchmark
that is known before they trade, they can "game" the cost-measurement system and
appear to trade favorably. In particular, a trader who cannot do better than
the known benchmark can defer trades indefinitely. There is also a natural
interpretation to costs measured relative to a post-execution benchmark: once
the trading package is completed, has it added value to the portfolio? If
purchases (sales) are accomplished at prices below (above) their values after
the trading pressure has waned, the package has added value and the manager does
not regret executing the transaction. We use the closing prices one and five
days after the end of a package for post-execution benchmarks. The excess
return from each trade in the package to the post-execution benchmark price is
calculated and then averaged across all the component trades, using trade
principal as weights, to yield the cost of a package. A positive cost is
denoted by a negative return from the package to the post-execution benchmark
for buys, or a positive return in the case of sells.
When measured relative to the opening price on the package's first day,
the market impact cost in Table IV is fairly large: combining the cost of
0.88 percent for buys with the cost of 0.44 percent for sells yields a round-
trip cost of 1.32 percent, or 49 cents per share. This echoes the evidence in
Table III that packages are accompanied by sizeable price changes. However, the
cost is heavily influenced by large trades—the simple mean round-trip cost of
0.59 percent is much lower than the principal-weighted average.
Since prices stay high after buying activity, the manager generally does
not regret having bought when the benchmark is the closing price one day after
the package finishes: there is actually a benefit (positive return) of
0.21 percent for buys. However, sales tend to be followed by a partial recovery
in the price, so that there is a cost of 0.22 percent relative to the closing
price on the day after the package ends. If more time is allowed for the
effects of trading to clear, the round-trip cost relative to the closing price
five days after the package is 0.08 percent on a principal-weighted average
basis, or three cents a share. Stoll (1993) uses data on the securities
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industry's aggregate trading gains on equities and estimates an average impact
cost of about 0.09 percent on exchange-listed securities over 1986-1988.
While the issue of the market impact costs of institutional trades arouses
considerable attention and controversy, remarkably little empirical evidence is
available. In part, this is because earlier researchers are unable to
distinguish between institutional trades and non-institutional trades. Instead,
their focus has been on a subset of trades where institutions are predominant,
namely block trades (trades in excess of 10,000 shares). The direction of a
trade is also not identified beforehand in previous studies but must be
inferred—trades following a price uptick are classified as purchases while
those following downticks are classified as sales. Previous research has
documented that large block trades have a substantial price impact relative to
the prior day's closing price in excess of 1 percent (Kraus and Stoll (1972),
Holthausen et al. (1987)). It is difficult to make any exact comparison with
the findings in Tables III and IV, given the differences in methodology and
samples. As one comparison, in Table III the principal-weighted return from the
open on the first day to the average price on the first day is 0.33 percent for
buys and -0.24 percent for sells. A perhaps closer comparison is with the
corresponding simple means in Table III: these are even less notable, at 0.11
for purchases and -0.26 for sales. Alternatively, when trades are treated as
part of a package, the principal-weighted return from the open on the first day
to the package is 0.88 percent for buys and -0.44 percent for sells. Again, the
mean returns are smaller in magnitude (0.29 percent and -0.30 percent for buys
and sells respectively) . In sum, our evidence suggests weaker price impacts,
even in the context of trade packages, than have been documented in earlier
research.
IV. THE ROLE OF FIRM SIZE AND TRADE COMPLEXITY
Table V analyzes the relation between firm size, trade complexity and the
behavior of stock prices around institutional trade packages. In order to
reduce clutter, we present the principal-weighted means for a subset of our
various measures of price behavior. Within each category of firm size
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(described in Table I), packages are divided into seven groups by trade
complexity
—
package size relative to normal daily volume, where normal daily
volume is measured over a forty day period prior to the package. The
breakpoints for these seven groups correspond to the 25-, 50-, 75-, 90-, 95- and
99-percentiles of the distribution of trade complexity within each size
classification, as reported in panel C of Table II. In addition, the bottom
panel of the table aggregates across complexity groups (using the proportion of
dollar principal as weights) within each size classification and thus reports
price behavior as firm size varies. Similarly, the last column in the table
gives the dollar-weighted average across size groups to yield results for each
complexity classification.
In the last column of panel A (buys), there is a tight relation between
price impact and trade complexity. The excess return from the open on the first
day of the package to the close on the last day is 0.13 percent for the easiest
trades, and rises monotonically to 1.85 percent for the most difficult packages.
Trades in this latter category also show the largest post-execution reversal
(-0.22 percent) in the five days after the completion of a package. The price
recovery, however, does not match the run-up in prices over the course of a
package, so that the price stays at its new higher level. Specifically, the
return from the opening price on the first day to the closing price five days
after the end of a package (analogous to the "permanent" price effect in
Holthausen et al. (1987, 1990)) is positive for each of the seven complexity
groups in the last column, ranging from 0.18 percent for the easiest trades to
1.63 percent for the hardest. This association is not inconsistent with the
notion that larger purchases are stronger signals of private information, which
becomes impounded into prices. If there is private information underlying the
trades, however, it does not appear to be confirmed by large abnormal returns in
the following twenty-day period.
The return from the first opening price to the last closing price of a
package is not systematically related to firm size. Managers buying smaller
stocks, however, are not likely to be trading with the same degree of urgency as
when buying large stocks; instead they may trade more opportunistically and
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hence generate less market impact. The relative lack of liquidity for the
smallest firms is apparent in the price reversal in the five-day period
following buy packages: in the smallest firms, the principal-weighted average
price reversal is 0.58 percent for the smallest firms while there is no change
in the prices of the largest firms.
The picture for sell packages in panel B is muddier. In particular, more
complicated sell packages are not necessarily associated with larger price
declines. While the return from the first open to the last close is negative in
each of the five size groups, there is only mixed evidence of any association
between the magnitude of the decline and firm size. Indeed, for the most
complicated trades in the smaller firms, the last closing price is on average
actually higher than the first opening price. All in all, the results in
panel B confirm the impression from the earlier tables that selling activity is
not based on disappointing prior performance of the stock or on negative
information, so that the price impact of selling activity is only weakly
associated with firm size and trade complexity.
Table VI provides statistics on the market impact cost of institutional
trade packages, classified by firm size and trade complexity. Here we focus on
the polar cases in the body of the table. When measured relative to the first
opening price of a package, the easiest packages in the largest firms incur a
round-trip cost of 0.18 percent, comprising a cost of 0.10 percent for buys and
0.08 percent for sells. Using the closing price one day after the end of a
package results in a cost of 0.14 percent for sells, offsetting a small benefit
of 0.03 percent for buys, yielding a round-trip cost of 0.11 percent. The
corresponding round-trip cost relative to the closing price five days after the
end of a package is 0.07 percent. At the other extreme, the three smallest
quintiles of stocks in the most complicated packages (which together account for
a similar fraction of principal as the easiest trades in the largest stocks) are
associated with a round-trip cost relative to the first opening price of
1.48 percent. These packages incur a round-trip cost of 0.61 percent relative
to the closing price one day after the package, or 0.71 percent relative to the
closing price five days after the end of the package. If the impact cost is
19
measured under the usual procedure of comparing each trade with the same-day
volume-weighted average price, the relation between round-trip costs, firm size
and trade complexity in many cases runs counter to intuition: for instance, the
round-trip cost for the easiest packages in the largest firms is 0.18 percent
while the three smallest quintiles in the hardest packages incur a round-trip
benefit of 0.11 percent.
V. PRICE IMPACT AND EXECUTION COST BY MONEY MANAGER
The average impact costs presented in Table IV are in general not
strikingly large, particularly in comparison with the results of prior research.
The low magnitude of the impact costs in the aggregate, however, does not imply
that investors should be unconcerned with execution costs. In particular, what
is of concern to any single institutional investor is not so much the average
cost of trading but rather its own cost of trading. The unparalleled features
of our data set permit us to go further by working at the level of the
individual money management organization.
The performance of a money management firm reflects the combined overall
performance of the money manager as well as the trading desk. Our various
measures of price impact and execution cost accordingly provide a suite of
benchmarks so that the money management organization's performance can be
evaluated along several different dimensions. For instance, a "successful"
money management organization that is able to seek out liquidity should buy
below and sell above the open; similarly, its trades should add value to the
portfolio so that it buys at prices below (sells at prices above) the closing
price after the end of the package. A firm that trades in a timely fashion and
hence does not miss too many opportunities (or one that does not tip its hand
before trading) would be characterized by a relatively low return before the
initiation of a package. The behavior of the stock price in the five-day period
after the completion of a package indicates the firm's skill in avoiding
transitory price disruptions, while the stock return over the twenty-day period
after the package attests to the quality of the manager's short-term
information.
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Table VII confirms that there is substantial dispersion across managers in
their principal-weighted average round-trip returns. Such variation cannot be
simply attributed to noise, since the average return for each manager is based
upon several thousand observations. If execution performance is measured
relative to the opening price, then one manager is incurring a cost of as much
as 2.75 percent whereas another manager is trading at prices 3.28 percent better
than the first day's opening, yielding a range of about six percent. The range
across managers in costs relative to the closing price five days after the
package is smaller but still very substantial (2.17 percent). The latter range
indicates how the difference between bad and good execution can amount to a
major drain on performance.
Another aspect of an organization's performance involves its timeliness or
foregone return, as measured by the five-day excess return before the beginning
of the package. The range for the opportunity cost is almost four percent—from
a high of 2.12 percent to a low of -1.86 percent. The returns in the five day
period after the package's last day vary from a reversal (signifying a cost) of
1.38 percent to a continuation (signifying a benefit) of 0.97 percent, amounting
to a range of 2.35 percent. Finally, the money managers' short-term performance
in the twenty-day post-package period run from a loss of 1.34 percent to the
best short-term performance gain of 2.02 percent.
Since there are so many aspects to successful execution performance, it
would be foolhardy to think that any single measure can represent an individual
organization's overall performance. Indeed, a closer inspection of several
cases in the body of Table VII illustrates the pitfalls in relying on any single
cost measure. Manager number 37, for instance, trades well relative to the pre-
execution benchmark (its round-trip cost betters the first day's open by
1.81 percent, ranking fourth in the sample); nonetheless, as of the closing
price five days after the package the firm's trades lose money to the amount of
-0.22 percent. On the other hand, manager 21 incurs a round-trip cost of
1.47 percent relative to the first open, but the same manager's trades
experience benefits of 0.49 percent from the package to the post-execution
benchmark. To take another case, manager 15 trades unfavorably relative to both
21
the pre-execution benchmark (its cost is 0.80 percent) and post-execution
benchmarks (0.35 percent cost); it experiences opportunity costs of 0.90 percent
and post-package price reversals of 0.26 percent—but when all is said and done,
the excess return on its portfolio over the twenty day period following the
package's last day is 0.68 percent (the eighth best in the sample). These
different examples indicate that no single measure can suffice for evaluating
execution cost; instead a comprehensive analysis is necessary.
VI. THE DETERMINANTS OF PRICE IMPACT AND EXECUTION COST
In order to disentangle the various influences on price impact and cost,
we fit the following regression model:
S 7 37
(1) r 4 = a * p Ci + Y, 6 i sU + £YjD ij + E*jMij + e ij-2 j-2 j-2
For each package i, we focus on five excess return measures, r.-: from the
package's first opening price to the closing price on the package's last day;
from the last close to the closing price five days after the end of the package;
from the first opening price to the package; from the package to the closing
price one day, and five days, after the end of the package. The explanatory
variables include c^, the commission cost for the package in cents per share
(the rationale for this definition of commission cost is discussed below) , and
dummy variables S-, D — and M»j, to capture the effects of market capitalization,
package complexity and managerial strategy, respectively. For example, S--
takes the value of one if the i-th package involves a stock in the j-th category
of firm size and is zero otherwise. The coefficients for the size effects are
normalized relative to the first category of firm size (the smallest firms).
Similarly, the coefficients for package complexity are normalized relative to
the first complexity category (the easiest trades), while the coefficients for
the manager effects are expressed relative to the first manager in the data set.
Separate regressions are fit for buy packages and for sell packages.
Panel A of Table VIII reports the adjusted R2 for variants of equation (1)
when each set of dummy variables is excluded, one at a time, from the full
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model. Most of the explanatory power of the model comes from the identity of
the money manager behind the trade: the goodness-of-f it of the model drops
markedly when the dummy variables for the money managers are excluded, but is
only slightly altered when the dummy variables for firm size and package
complexity are dropped.
Panel B of Table VIII reports the estimated coefficients of the full model
for buys and, in parentheses, for sells. In light of the very large sample
size, the coefficients are generally large relative to their standard errors,
and we therefore focus on their economic significance of the coefficients.
The coefficient for commission cost reflects any trade-off between
commission expenses and market impact cost. 2 On the whole, however, the
coefficient for commission expense is not large. The equation for impact cost
relative to the closing price five days after the end of a package for sales
provides the strongest evidence for a trade-off between commission cost and
market impact cost: the coefficient is -0.87, suggesting that an increase in
the commission cost of one cent per share lowers the impact cost by
0.0087 percent, equivalent to a dollar savings of 0.32 cents on a stock with the
average price of $36.50. However, commissions include payments for services
unrelated to trade execution such as research services. Moreover, some brokers
may also rebate part of the commission expenses in the form of "soft-dollar"
services. These unobserved components of the commission would confound any
association between price impact or cost and commission expenses.
The results for the influence of firm size and package complexity in
panel B of Table VIII generally parallel the findings from Tables VI and VII.
Instead of presenting the individual coefficients for each of the 36 money
managers, we report selected percentiles of the distribution of the
coefficients. Controlling for firm size and package complexity, considerable
variation still exists across managers with respect to their price impact. The
impact from the first opening price of the package to the last closing price
ranges from -1.13 percent in the tenth percentile for buys (-0.82 percent for
sells) to 0.35 percent in the ninetieth percentile (0.88 percent), yielding a
difference of 1.48 percent for buys (1.70 percent for sells). The corresponding
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range for the five-day price reversal following a buy package is 0.68 percent
and is 0.86 percent for sales. Similar dispersion across managers also exists
with respect to their impact costs, although the range varies with the choice of
benchmark. When measured relative to the opening price on the first day of a
package, the cost ranges from -0.91 percent in the tenth percentile for buys to
0.43 percent in the ninetieth percentile, with a difference of 1.34 percent; the
dispersion for sales is similar at 1.45 percent. The spread between the tenth
and ninetieth percentiles of costs relative to the post-execution benchmarks is
relatively lower (less than 1 percent). 3
We conjecture that the differences across money managers observed in
Table VII stem mainly from differences in their patience or demand for immediacy
in trading. Other things equal, a less patient trader will tend to incur larger
impact costs, perhaps because he perceives his information to be highly
perishable. A manager's degree of patience is difficult to quantify. 4
Nevertheless, a money manager's demand for immediacy is very likely to be
related to observable characteristics such as the manager's investment style and
portfolio turnover rate. Data on investment style (value versus growth) and on
portfolio turnover are available for sixteen of our 37 money management
organizations. Other things equal, a portfolio manager with low turnover would
be considered a more patient investor with low price impact. An investor for
whom immediacy is more important (such as a growth-oriented manager) would tend
to have a higher impact cost.
We classify managers either by their style (panel A, Table IX), or into
two equally-sized groups on the basis of average portfolio turnover rate
(panel B, Table IX), and compare the average round-trip principal-weighted
returns achieved by the two groups. In panel A, the differences between the two
groups are striking: growth-oriented managers incur a round-trip cost relative
to the first open of 0.70 percent while value-oriented managers experience a
benefit of 0.40 percent, so that the difference amounts to a full 1.10 percent.
Packages executed by growth-oriented managers are also marked by large price
impact from the first day's open to the last day's close; in contrast, the
packages executed by value-oriented managers are associated with negative price
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impact from the first day's open to the last day's close. If growth managers
trade with greater impatience and give up a temporary price concession for
greater immediacy, while value managers trade more patiently and supply
immediacy to other investors, then the price reversals should be larger
following the packages of growth-oriented managers. There is indeed a
relatively large difference between the 0.09 percent reversal following the
packages executed by growth-oriented managers, compared to the 0.20 percent
continuation subsequent to value-oriented managers' packages. The larger market
impact incurred by growth-oriented managers might be justified if their trades
subsequently experience higher returns—on the contrary, however, the short-term
performance in the twenty day period following the package is actually somewhat
lower for growth-oriented managers than for value-oriented managers. Dramatic
differences also arise when managers are classified into high- and low-turnover
groups (panel B): managers with high turnover rates experience higher costs and
larger price impact across-the-board than do managers with low turnover rates.
In particular, there is a difference of 0.30 percent between the price reversal
following packages executed by high-turnover managers and the price continuation
following packages executed by low-turnover managers. This finding is
consistent with the notion that managers with high turnover pay a price
concession for greater immediacy.
Since the analysis in panels A and B of Table IX is based on a relatively
small subset of our managers, the results are only suggestive of the cost of
immediacy in trading. Moreover, the results do not control for differences
across managers in the size of their trades, or the capitalization of the traded
stocks. Panel C of the table provides an additional clue as to the cost of
immediacy. Within each category of firm size and trade complexity as described
in Tables V and VI, we calculate the principal-weighted average impact cost and
length across all the packages of each of our 37 money managers. Package length
is defined as the number of trading days on which trades are executed over the
course of a package. All the managers in a size-complexity classification are
then divided into two equally-sized groups on the basis of the average package
length. We then average the cost measures associated with each group of
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managers across all the size-complexity classifications, using the number of
dollars traded in each classification as weights. The results thus signify the
average market impact cost for short packages (denoting high demand for
immediacy) and long packages (denoting low demand for immediacy) for similarly-
sized trades in similarly-sized firms.
The results in panel C strongly confirm the cost differences between the
packages executed by relatively impatient managers versus relatively patient
managers. Impact costs are lower for lengthier packages: the cost relative to
the pre-execution benchmark for long packages is 0.79 percent, compared to the
cost for short packages of 1.44 percent; the cost relative to the post-execution
benchmark is also lower for long packages. In addition, the price pressure from
the first open to the last close is lower for lengthier packages, as is the
post-package price reversal. There is no evidence that short-term performance
is higher after short packages than for long packages. All in all, Table IX
provides evidence suggesting that price impact and execution costs are heavily
influenced by the trader's demand for immediacy in trading, as proxied by
investment style, turnover rate and package length. Further research to spell
out the precise nature of these linkages is clearly called for.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Multi-day trade packages make up a common and sizeable portion of
institutional equity trading. Only twenty percent of the dollar value traded in
our sample is completed within a day, while more than half of the dollar value
traded requires four or more trading days for execution. This finding suggests
that the price impact and execution cost of institutional trades is best
analyzed at the level of trade packages. Our results are based on an analysis
of institutions' actual trading behavior on a very large sample of transactions,
both big and small, over two and a half years. The direction of each trade is
reported, and we are able to discriminate between different money managers'
trades.
As it turns out, the estimates of the price impact of institutional trades
are substantially higher when trades are evaluated not individually but in the
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broader context of a package. Buy packages are associated with a principal-
weighted average price change of almost 1 percent from the open on the package's
first day to the close on the last day. The corresponding price change of -0.35
percent for sell packages is less dramatic, but still sizeable. By way of
comparison, if the analysis is conducted at the level of individual transactions
(Chan and Lakonishok (1992)), the principal-weighted price change from the open
to the close on the trade date is 0.34 percent for buys and -0.04 percent for
sells.
The overall price impact of purchases and sales is not symmetric, echoing
earlier evidence based on individual transactions (Kraus and Stoll (1972),
Holthausen et al. (1987, 1990), Keim and Madhavan (1991), Chan and Lakonishok
(1992)). Purchases are accompanied by a large increase in the stock price with
little sign of subsequent reversal; sales are associated with a relatively
smaller price decline, and a relatively stronger reversal, although the price
does not fully recover.
Our results on market impact cost, when measured in the broader context of
a package, are also substantially higher than comparable results for individual
trades, including both block and non-block trades (Chan and Lakonishok (1992)).
The round-trip impact cost for packages reaches 1.32 percent when the opening
price of the first day is the benchmark and the packages are principal weighted.
Giving the same weight to each package would lower the price impact to 0.59
percent. When post-execution benchmarks are used, the average round-trip impact
costs are less than 0.10 percent.
There is, of course, no single unambiguous definition of market impact
cost. Our various measures differ with respect to the choice of a benchmark
price, and each benchmark has some merit and some problems. For example, the
opening price as a benchmark can be "gamed"; only trades for less than the open
will be executed. We have money managers in our sample who are making money on
execution, based on the opening price: they buy below the open and sell above
the open. However, based on a post-execution benchmark, some of these money
managers perform poorly and several days after the package are sorry for having
done the trade (in the sense that they buy above or sell below the post-
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execution benchmark)". Clearly, buying below the open is not good enough if one
day later the price is lower than the price at which the trades were executed.
This inconsistency between the two measures might simply be a result of buying
from an informed trader who is anxious to get out of his position. Accordingly,
the execution performance of a money manager cannot be summarized by one single
cost measure; instead it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive examination at
the level of packages.
Regardless of the specific cost measure, we find that market impact
differs greatly across money managers. Indeed, our regression analysis suggests
that the importance of firm size and trade complexity as determinants of price
impact and execution cost pales beside the importance of the identity of the
money manager behind the trade. Some preliminary evidence suggests that the
differences across money managers are, in turn, related to their different
degrees of urgency to trade, as indicated by such variables as investment style,
portfolio turnover and package length. Packages executed over a shorter number
of days are associated with an impact of 1.44 percent relative to the pre-
execution benchmark; the corresponding impact cost for lengthier packages,
holding trade complexity and firm size constant, is 0.79 percent. Costs also
tend to be generally higher for growth-oriented managers than for value-oriented
managers, and are higher for managers with high turnover rates.
The idea that a higher demand for immediacy in trade execution tends to be
associated with a larger price impact or execution cost is not new. For
example, Loeb (1983) measures trading cost as the spreads quoted for immediate
execution of orders of varying size. It would be naive, of course, to think
that an institutional investor would bring its entire order to market at once
and bear the cost of immediate execution. Instead, as we have documented in
this paper, an institutional order is likely to be worked over a period of
several days. Only by tracking the behavior of the stock price around and
during the entire sequence of trades can any reliable measure of price impact or




1There is some weak evidence in Table I that buy packages take longer to
complete than sell packages—53.2 percent of the value of buy packages take four
days or longer, compared to 50.7 percent for sell packages. This evidence
suggests that sales may be easier for the market to accommodate than purchases.
2The commission cost for institutional investors (at least for trading in
U.S. equities) is customarily set on a cents per share basis, irrespective of
the stock price level. For a given package, the less expensive broker is thus
the one charging fewer cents per share. Nonetheless, the cheaper broker, if
given packages in lower-priced stocks for execution, will appear to have a high
percentage commission rate. In assessing the relation between commission cost
and market impact cost across packages with different price levels, therefore,
it is necessary to express the commission cost on a dollar, rather than on a
percentage, basis.
Since the opening price on the first day of a package is known if and when
a manager begins to trade, managers might differ in several respects: their
skill in seeking out liquidity, ability to trade in advance of information, as
well as how they react to price changes after the opening price. If, on the
other hand, the benchmark price is not established until after a manager has
finished trading, the dispersion across managers would be expected to be
smaller.
4Other influences on price impact or execution cost such as the competence
of the portfolio manager and trading desk/ as well as the management firm's
investment in trading facilities, cannot be measured.
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Table I
Frequency distribution of trade packages, by package length
(percent of principal in parentheses)
The sample comprises all trades of NYSE and Amex stocks by 37 institutional money
management firms from July 1, 1986 to December 30, 1988 (excluding October 1987). A
buy (sell) package in a stock is a case where the same money management firm
executed successive purchases (sales) of the same stock, with a break of less than
5 days between successive trades. The length of a package is the number of days in
the package on which trading occurred. Results are presented for all packages, and
also classified by the capitalization of the stock at the end of the prior quarter.
The size classification is based on the quintiles of the size distribution of all
NYSE and Amex stocks
.
Panel A: Buys (74,581 packages; $87.0 billion principal)
Size group 1 Trade 1 Day 2-3 Days 4-6 Days > 6 Days
1 37.1 (20.0) 48.6 (28.9) 31.2 (27.9) 13.7 (19.4) 6.5 (23.8)
3.1% of packages
0.2% of principal
2 35.6 (16.9) 48.2 (29.5) 31.1 (26.0) 14.0 (20.4) 6.7 (24.1)
7.4% of packages
1.0% of principal
3 40.8 (15.3) 52.7 (24.3) 29.8 (28.4) 11.3 (20.3) 6.2 (27.0)
13.2% of packages
4.2% of principal
4 49.9 (13.7) 58.6 (21.4) 26.2 (27.0) 9.9 (23.0) 5.3 (28.6)
24.3% of packages
17.3% of principal
5 52.8 (12.5) 61.9 (19.4) 25.0 (26.5) 8.3 (21.5) 4.8 (32.6)
52.0% of packages
77.4% of principal
All 48.8 (12.9) 58.5 (20.1) 26.6 (26.7) 9.7 (21.7) 5.3 (31.5)
Panel B: Sells (81,208 packages; $99.7 billion principal)
1 46.8 (19.4) 57.6 (30.1) 24.1 (25.6) 10.9 (24.8) 7.4 (19.5)
1.3% of packages
0.1% of principal
2 45.6 (16.5) 54.7 (24.7) 26.2 (25.1) 11.4 (19.8) 7.7 (30.5)
4.1% of packages
0.7% of principal
3 45.8 (17.3) 57.0 (28.7) 25.7 (27.3) 10.6 (20.7) 6.7 (23.3)
11.2% of packages
4.2% of principal
4 54.6 (17.0) 62.6 (25.3) 23.5 (28.0) 8.8 (21.2) 5.1 (25.5)
24.3% of packages
16.5% of principal
5 55.3 (13.7) 64.5 (21.0) 23.8 (27.1) 7.5 (20.3) 4.2 (31.6)
59.1% of packages
78.5% of principal
All 53.6 (14.4) 62.7 (22.1) 24.1 (27.2) 8.4 (20.5) 4.9 (30.2)
Table II
Mean and fractiles of distribution
of trade packages by institutional money managers
The sample comprises all trades of NYSE and AMEX stocks by 37 institutional
money management firms from July 1, 1986 to December 30, 1988 (excluding
October 1987). A buy (sell) package in a stock is a case where the same money
management firm executed successive purchases (sales) of the same stock, with
a break of less than 5 days between successive trades. Results are presented
for all packages, and also classified by the capitalization of the stock at
the end of the prior quarter. The size classification i3 based on the
guintiles of the size distribution of all NYSE and Amex stocks.










1 2 3 4
(Large)
5
Mean 35.3 8.9 15.6 22.8 36.6 42.3 36.2 18.4 25.5 29.6 35.3 38.9
Median 6.8 3.2 6.0 8.0 8.7 6.3 6.5 5.0 8.0 10.0 8.2 5.4
10% 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.3
25% 1.7 1.3 2.0 2.5 2.0 1.4 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.5 1.7 1.1
75% 26.9 7.5 15.5 21.6 30.0 31.2 28.0 17.6 23.1 30.0 30.0 27.0
90% 85.1 20.0 39.0 53.6 89.4 101.3 89.0 50.0 61.0 75.0 87.9 98.4
95% 150.0 35.0 60.4 96.1 147.6 192.9 160.0 89.6 101.9 125.5 153.9 180.0
99% 450.0 92.6 144.0 242.8 407.1 545.0 463.8 204.2 247.2 300.0 400.0 535.1










1 2 3 4
(Large)
5
Mean 1167 68 159 379 850 1723 1228 124 242 487 846 1619
Median 175 23 66 138 202 270 197 32 78 162 201 239
10% 14 4 7 14 13 19 13 5 8 12 12 15
25% 44 10 24 45 47 58 44 12 25 44 42 50
75% 801 51 150 350 779 1371 854 111 231 482 763 1166
90% 2733 '126 343 903 2164 4398 2847 279 592 1211 2191 3956
95% 5284 238 606' 1524 3600 7903 5463 487 990 1992 3684 7403
99% 16038 780 1622 3948 9042 21568 16402 1484 2552 4925 9137 20960










1 2 3 4
(Large)
5
Mean 0.66 2.19 1.75 1.19 0.72 0.25 0.61 3.24 2.25 1.57 0.69 0.22
Median 0.11 0.89 0.68 0.42 0.18 0.03 0.07 0.92 0.70 0.46 0.15 0.03
10% 0.00 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00
25% 0.02 0.39 0.25 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.33 0.23 0.12 0.03 0.01
75% 0.53 2.09 1.71 1.15 0.66 0.17 0.39 2.97 2.13 1.49 0.59 0.14
90% 1.57 4.75 4.14 2.84 1.78 0.60 1.38 8.23 5.38 3.62 1.69 0.51
95% 2.86 7.77 6.63 4.68 3.06 1.13 2.66 12.99 8.40 6.10 2.96 1.02
99% 7.98 23.38 17.48 12.21 7.70 3.31 8.17 31.54 21.90 16.31 7.76 3.11
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Table IV
Mean, standard deviation and fractiles of distribution of
percentage price impact cost and commission rate, for
buy packages (panel A) and sell packages (panel B)
Sample comprises all trades of NYSE and Amex stocks by 37 institutional money
management firms from July 1, 1986 to December 30, 1988 (excluding October 1987). A
buy (sell) package in a stock is a case where the same money management firm
executed successive purchases (sales) of the same stock, with a break of less than
5 days between successive trades. Impact cost from the open on first day to package
is measured as follows. We measure the returns from the opening price on a
package's first day to each trade in the package; the cost for the package is then
the principal-weighted average of these returns in excess of the buy-and-hold
returns on a matching size decile control portfolio over the corresponding interval.
Impact costs from the package to the closing price one (five) days after the
package's last day are similarly defined, using the principal-weighted average of
the excess returns from each trade in the package to the closing price one (five)
days after the package's last day. Cost using the same-day volume-weighted price is
the return from the volume-weighted average of all transaction prices in the stock
on the trade date to the trade price; the cost for a package is the principal-
weighted average of the costs for all trades in the package.
Open on Package to Package to Using
first day close one close five same-day
to day after days after volume-weighted Commission
package last day last day price rate











0.88 0.21 0.13 0.03 0.19
0.29 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.31
2.32 2.77 4.14 0.80 0.32
0.49 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.99
0.00 -0.03 -0.10 0.04 0.20
-lo90 -2.70 -4.70 -0.67 0.08
-0.63 -1.30 -2.40 -0.23 0.12
1.10 1.40 2.30 0.36 0.35











-0.44 0.22 0.22 -0.05 0.19
-0.30 0.18 0.05 -0.14 0.29
2.33 2.65 4.01 0.79 0.57
0.53 0.49 0.51 0.60 0.00
-0.17 0.06 -0.09 0.10 0.21
-2.60 -2.60 -4.60 -0.91 0.09
-1.18 -1.16 -2.30 -0.43 0.13
0.50 1.39 2.20 0.16 0.33
1.82 3.10 4.90 0.57 0.56
Tafile V
Principal-weighted average returns (in percent) around and during
institutional buy packages (panel A) and sell packages (panel B),
classified by market value of outstanding equity at end of
prior quarter, and complexity (package principal value
in relation to average daily volume over a prior 40-day period)
Sample comprises all trades of NYSE and Amex stocks by 37 institutional
money management firms from July 1, 1986 to December 30, 1988 (excluding
October 1987). A buy (sell) package in a stock is a case where the same
money management firm executed successive purchases (sales) of the same
stock with a break of less than 5 days between successive trades.
Returns are measured in excess of the buy-and-hold returns on a matching
size decile control portfolio over the corresponding interval.
(a) Easiest
1st open to last close






1st open to last close
Last close to close-t-5
Pre-20 performance
Post-20 performance
Percent of principal 0.02
Average complexity 0.62
(c) Complexity group 3
Smallest Largest All
firms 2 3 4 firms firms
Panel A: Buys
-1.26 0.32 0.34 0.15 0.12 0.13
-0.S8 -0.11 -0.08 0.33 0.00 0.05
-4.91 -0.89 -0.07 -0.61 -0.28 -0.34
-1.S1 0.16 0.22 0.71 0.07 0.18
0.02 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.83 1.14
0.19 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.02
P 2
-0.34 -0.27 0.22 0.38 0.13 0.17
-0.52 0.10 -0.10 0.03 o.os 0.04
-0.63 -0.76 -0.69 0.18 0.05 0.03











1st open to last close 0.11 0.19 0.56 0.67 0.43 0.47
Last close to close+5 -0.07 -0.03 -0.19 0.01 0.06 0.04
Pre-20 performance 0.23 O.OS 0.19 0.17 0.33 0.29
Post-20 performance -o.so -0.30 0.21 ,0.01 0.12 0.10
Percent of principal 0.02 0.19 0.77 3.04 11.50 15.52
Average complexity 1.38 1.10 0.72 0.37 0.08 0.33
(d) Complexity group 4
1st open to last close 0.53 2.06 1.21 1.14 0.77 0.87
Last close to close+5 -0.80 -0.67 -0.46 -0.23 0.02 -0.05
Pre-20 performance 0.51 0.82 0.63 1.19 0.68 0.76
Post-20 performance -1.10 -0.87 0.24 0.01 -0.04 -0.03
Percent of principal 0.03 0.24 1.02 4.64 21.19 27.12
Average complexity
f
3.02 2.59 1.77 1.09 0.33 0.95
(e) Complexity group 5
1st open to last close 1.68 1.82 2.28 1.39 0.83 1.00
Last close to close+5 -0.48 -0.52 -0.63 -0.17 -0.01 -0.07
Pre-20 performance 1.00 0.43 1.62 0.72 1.07 1.03
Post-20 performance 0.93 -1.04 0.16 -0.10 0.19 0.13
Percent of principal 0.02 0.12 0.66 2.86 14.05 17.71
Average complexity 6.03 5.17 3.60 2.33 0.82 2.01
(f) Complexity group 6
1st open to last close 1.79 0.70 2.13 1.81 1.13 1.29
Last close to close+5 -0.99 -0.82 -0.13 -0.38 -0.05 -0.12
Pre-20 performance 6.10 0.29 2.46 1.02 0.89 0.98
Post-20 performance -1.26 -2.20 0.72 -0.61 0.22 0.07
Percent of principal 0.03 0.19 0.82 3.71 18.51 23.25
Average complexity 13.07 9.82 6.99 4.47 1.84 4.02
(g) Most difficult
•
1st open to last close 2.31 3.26 3.60 1.72 1.77 1.85
Last close to close+5 -0.14 -0.69 -0.38 -0.80 -0.07 -0.22
Pre-20 performance -0.55 6.02 2.16 2.18 1.56 1.73
Post-20 performance 4.94 0.64 -0.22 -0.25 0.08 0.02
Percent of principal 0.02 0.09 0.44 2.00 9.30 11.85
Average complexity 37.35 27.29 20.51 13.74 6.50 12.30
(h) All trades
1st open to last close 1.12 1.4S 1.75 1.30 0.90
Last close to close+5 -0.58 -0.55 -0.3S -0.27 0.00
Pre-20 performance 1.63 1.05 1.29 0.97 0.81
Post-20 performance 0.02 -0.91 0.27 -0.19 0.10
Percent of principal 0.16 0.95 4.17 17.34 77.37
Average complexity 2.13 1.70 1.19 0.71 0.25
Table V (continued)
Smallest Largest Ml
firms 2 3 4 firms firms
Panel 3; Sells
(a) Easiest
1st open to last close -3.38 -0.45 -0.08 0.17 0.08 0.08
Last close to cloae+5 -0.70 -0.12 -0.48 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10
Pre-20 performance -8.13 1.30 0.51 1.12 0.20 0.36
Post-20 performance -6.41 0.42 -0.60 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09
Percent of principal 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.91 1.14
Average complexity 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01
(b) Complexity group 2
1st open to last close -2.67 -0.99 -0.25 0.07 0.08 0.05
Last close to close+5 -1.01 -0.32 -0.33 -0.17 -0.05 -0.09
Pre-20 performance -1.82 0.66 1.40 1.46 0.15 0.41
Post-20 performance -3.94 -0.68 -0.32 -0.17 -0.16 -0.18
Percent of principal 0.01 0.05 0.31 0.79 2.23 3.39
Average complexity 0.60 0.42 0.27 0.08 0.02 0.10
(c) Complexity group 3
1st open to last close -0.99 -1.25 -0.44 -0.32 -0.16 -0.21
Last close to close+5 -1.27 -0.15 -0.18 0.01 -0.10 -0.09
Pre-20 performance 1.62 1.32 1.60 1.34 0.10 0.37
Post-20 performance -1.71 0.22 -0.46 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16
Percent of principal 0.02 0.14 0.86 2.89 10.11 14.01
Average complexity 1.69 1.27 0.86 0.32 0.07 0.29
(d) Complexity group 4
1st open to last close -3.30 -0.80 -0.68 -0.57 -0.37 -0.42
Last close to close+5 -0.07 0.16 -0.04 0.15 -0.02 0.01
Pre-20 performance 1.25 1.52 1.46 0.91 -0.01 0.21
Post-20 performance -0.76 0.56 -0.54 0.18 -0.15 -0.11
Percent of principal 0.02 0.20 1.08 4.53 20.11 25.95
Average complexity 4.80 3.34 2.33 1.01 0.27 0.84
(e) Complexity group 5
1st open to last close -1.19 -1.91 -0.31 -0.03 -0.68 -0.57
Last close to close+5 -1.43 0.67 0.21 0.21 0.03 0.07
Pre-20 performance -4.23 3.58 1.74 2.00 0.05 0.44
Post-20 performance -2.03 -0.54 -0.04 0.41 -0.11 -0.03
Percent of principal 0.02 0.11 0.61 2.72 14.51 17.98
Average complexity 10.01 6.69 4.60 2.23 0.72 1.84
(f) Complexity group 6
1st open to last close -0.86 -0.39 0.38 0.38 -0.73 -0.50
Last close to close+5 -0.71 0.06 -0.30 0.00 0.21 0.15
Pre-20 performance -2.14 3.20 4.35 1.33 -0.23 0.21
Post-20 performance -1.10 1.11 1.61 0.02 0.15 0.20
Percent of principal 0.02 0.14 0.89 3.57 20.90 25.51
Average complexity 20.98 12.53 9.33 4.50 1.69 3.79
(g) Most difficult
1st open to last close 3.12 0.57 0.64 0.37 -0.28 -0.12
Last close to close+5 -0.88 1.16 0.50 0.09 0.51 0.45
Pre-20 performance 1.43 13.48 2.52 3.52 0.34 1.02
Post-20 performance 1.11 0.95 1.31 0.42 -0.16 0.01
Pereent of principal 0.01 0.06 0.37 1.89 9.69 12.02
Average complexity 42.04 47.15 31.83 14.22 5.68 12.42
(h) All trades
1st open to last close -1.19 -0.80 -0.13 -0.05 -0.46
Last close to close+5 -0.78 0.29 -0.03 0.08 0.10
Pre-20 performance -0.73 3.73 2.38 1.62 0.01
Post-20 performance -1.15 0.46 0.34 0.15 -0.06
Percent of principal 0.10 0.73 4.18 16.53 78.46
Average complexity 2.85 2.16 1.52 0.68 0.22
Table VI
Principal-weighted average market impact costs (in percent) for
institutional buy packages (panel A) and sell packages (panel B)
,
classified by market value of outstanding equity at end of prior
quarter, and complexity (package principal value in relation
to average daily volume over a prior 40-day period)*
(a) Easiest












































firms 2 3 4 firms firms
Panel A: Buys
0.16 0.07 0.17 0.27 0.10 0.13
-0.30 0.32 0.22 -0.10 0.03 0.02































-0.15 -0.23 -0.03 0.01
-0.01 -0.19 -0.02 0.02











0.75 1.00 1.41 1.10 0.81
0.60 0.83 0.33 0.29 0.17






-0.06 -0.03 0.37 0.47 0.31 0.34
-0.07 0.48 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.16
0.08 0.38 0.09 0.21 0.18 0.18
0.06
0.07 1.24 1.01 0.87 0.60 0.67
0.72 0.91 0.12 0.29 0.21 0.23
-0.10 0.19 -0.14 0.10 0.20 0.17
0.04
1.46 0.77 1.89 0.98 0.71 0.81
0.37 1.28 0.42 0.48 0.07 0.17
-0.34 0.72 -0.02 0.26 0.04 0.08
0.01
1.06 0.81 1.66 1.79 1.09 1.24
0.30 0.42 0.88 0.30 0.15 0.21
-0.60 -0.64 0.57 0.02 0.07 0.07
0.02
2.02 2.94 2.93 1.60 1.83 1.85
2.42 1.49 -0.21 0.15 0.37 0.32
1.15 0.78 -0.21 -0.54 0.37 0.20
-0.01
-0.13 -0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.03
Table VI (continued)
(a) Easiest




























-0.05 0.07 0.41 0.26 0.14 0.17


























-1.61 -1.20 -0.68 -0.43 -0.21 -0.28
0.32 0.01 0.24 0.17 0.08 0.10
-0.35 -0.17 -0.02 0.15 -0.05 -0.01
-0.10
-1.94 -0.83 -0.71 -0.57 -0.32 -0.38
0.46 0.24 0.23 0.17 -0.01 0.03
0.14 0.21 0.11 0.21 -0.05 0.00
-0.18 -0.12 -0.10 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06
(e) Complexity group


























First open to package -1.44 -0.55 0.01 0.20 -0.69 -0.51
Package to close+1 1.70 1.48 0.51 0.63 0.13 0.24
Package to close+5 1.76 1.57 0.23 0.58 0.13 0.22
Cost relative to
same day average -0.36 -0.23 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(g) Most difficult
First open to package 3.83 0.04 0.19 -0.19 -0.62 -0.50
Package to close+1 -2.52 1.39 1.24 1.00 0.95 0.97
Package to close+5 -1.25 2.74 1.51 0.99 1.27 1.24
Cost relative to
same day average 1.91 -0.07 0.08 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03
(h) All trades
First open to package -1.08 -0.72 -0.37 -0.21 -0.47
Package to close+1 0.39 0.58 0.47 0.41 0.16
Package to close+5 0.10 0.86 0.35 0.40 0.17
Cost relative to
same day average 0.06 -0.14 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05
Note for Table VI
Sample comprises all trades of NYSE and Amex stocks by 37
institutional money management firms from July 1, 1986 to December 30,
1988 (excluding October 1987). A buy (sell) package in a stock is a
case where the same money management firm executed successive purchases
(sales) of the same stock, with a break of less than 5 days between
successive trades. Impact cost from the open on first day to package is
measured as follows. We measure the returns from the opening price on a
package's first day to each trade in the package; the cost for the
package is then the principal-weighted average of these returns in
excess of the buy-and-hold returns on a matching size decile control
portfolio over the corresponding interval. Impact costs from the
package to the closing price one (five) days after the package's last
day are similarly defined, using the principal-weighted average of the
excess returns from each trade in the package to the closing price one
(five) days after the package's last day. Cost using the same-day
volume-weighted price is the return from the volume-weighted average of
all transaction prices in the stock on the trade date to the trade
price; the cost for a package is the principal-weighted average of the
costs for all trades in the package.
Table VII
Principal-weighted average round-trip returns (in percent)
by money management firm, with ranking in parentheses
(rank 1 is best performance, rank 37 is worst performance)*
From From
package close on
From open to close 5 5 days last day to 20 days
on first day days after before close 5 days after
Manager to package3 last day5 first day after package package
1 1.28 (28) 0.00 (12) 0.42 (21) 0.02 (14) 0.38 (12)
2 0.74 (20) -0.10 (15) 0.10 (18) -0.01 (15) 0.29 (18)
3 0.56 (17) -0.48 (31) 0.31 (20) -0.59 (33) -0.55 (29)
4 -2.30 ( 2) 0.29 ( 8) -0.32 (11) 0.45 ( 5) 0.36 (13)
5 -0.51 ( 6) 0.27 ( 9) -1.23 ( 5) 0.42 ( 6) 0.33 (16)
6 -1.98 ( 3) 0.94 ( 1) -1.47 ( 3) 0.97 ( 1) 0.57 (10)
7 0.09 (10) 0.61 ( 2) -0.13 (16) 0.69 ( 3) 1.63 ( 2)
8 0.08 ( 9) -0.32 (26) -0.19 (12) -0.27 (25) -0.27 (24)
9 0.75 (21) 0.33 ( 5) -0.15 (14) 0.03 (13) -0.05 (21)
10 2.15 (35) -0.54 (32) 2.12 (37) -0.57 (31) -0.57 (31)
11 0.70 (19) -0.21 (21) -0.14 (15) -0.18 (22) 0.26 (19)
12 0.13 [12) -0.22 (23) -0.35 (10) -0.01 (16) 0.06 (20)
13 0.06
[ 8) -1.23 (37) -1.01 ( 8) 1.38 (37) -1.34 (37)
14 1.05 [25) -0.23 (24) 0.48 [22) -0.38 (28) -0.94 (34)
15 0.80 [23) -0.35 (28) 0.90 [28) -0.26 (24) 0.68 ( 8)
16 1.64 |[31) 0.00 (14) 0.56 [25) -0.33 [27) -0.37 (27)
17 2.13 | 34) -0.73 (34) 2.08 136) -1.13 [36) -0.70 (33)
18 -3.28 | 1) -0.16 (18) -1.21 6) -0.59 [32) -0.98 (35)
19 0.48 { 16) -0.30 (25) 0.04 |[17) -0.33 [26) -0.65 (32)
20 0.13 | 11) -0.33 (27) 0.75 | 26) -0.03 [17) -0.23 (23)
21 1.47 | 29) 0.49 ( 3) -0.15 < 13) -0.04 | 18) 0.35 (14)
22 0.40 i 14) -1.16 (36) -1.46 | 4) -0.15 | 20) 0.89 ( 5)
23 -1.55
< 5) 0.26 (10) -1.68 | 2) 0.55 | 4) 0.61 ( 9)
24 1.07
( 26) 0.33 ( 6) 0.50 I 24) 0.35 | 8) 1.40 ( 4)
25 0.67
( 18) 0.32 ( 7) 0.83 i 27) 0.41 | 7) 1.41 ( 3)
26 2.01 ( 33) -0.70 (33) 1.62 ( 33) -0.69 | 34) -0.55 (30)
27 1.73 ( 32) -0.14 (17) 1.93 ( 35) -0.24 ( 23) 0.84 ( 6)
28 -0.38
( 7) -0.16 (19) -0.59 < 9) 0.22 ( 10) 0.32 (17)
29 0.77 ( 22) -0.99 (35) 0.22 ( 19) -0.79 ( 35) -0.43 (28)
30 1.51 | 30) -0.41 (29) 0.50 ( 23) -0.48 ( 29) 0.33 (15)
31 2.75 ( 37) -0.17 (20) 1.53 ( 32) -0.54 | 30) -0.22 (22)
32 0.92 ( 24) -0.48 (30) 1.78 ( 34) -0.08 ( 19) -1.21 (36)
33 2.44 ( 36) 0.00 (13) 1.42 ( 3D -0.16 ( 21) -0.35 (26)
34 0.17 ( 13) -0.11 (16) 1.06 ( 29) 0.07 ( 11) -0.33 (25)
35 1.21 ( 27) 0.47 ( 4) 1.14 ( 30) 0.24 ( 9) 0.53 (11)
36 0.41 ( 15) 0.11 (11) -1.16 ( 7) 0.07 ( 12) 2.02 ( 1)
37 -1.81 ( 4) -0.22 (22) -1.86 ( 1) 0.74 ( 2) 0.68 ( 7)
Mean 0.50 -0.14 0.19 -0.11 0.11
Std. deviation 1.33 0.47 1.10 0.50 0.78
Median 0.70 -0.16 0.22 -0.08 0.26
10-percentile -1.84 -0.78 -1.46 -0.71 -0.95
25-percentile 0.09 -0.38 -0.47 -0.43 -0.49
75-percentile 1.38 0.27 0.98 0.23 0.59
90-percentile 2.13 0.47 1.81 0.58 1.40
Range 6.03 2.17 3.98 2.35 3.36
Notes for Table VII
*Sample comprises all trades of NYSE and Amex stocks by 37
institutional money management firms from July 1, 1986 to December 30,
1988 (excluding October 1987). A buy (sell) package in a stock is a
case where the same money management firm executed successive purchases
(sales) of the same stock, with a break of less than 5 days between
successive trades. Round-trip returns are the returns for buy packages
minus the return on sell packages. Returns are in excess of the buy-
and-hold returns on a matching size decile control portfolio over the
corresponding interval
.
aExcess returns are computed from the opening price on a package's
first day to each trade in the package; the return for a package is the
principal-weighted average of these returns across all trades in the
package
.
Excess returns are computed from each trade in a package to the
closing price five days after the package's last day; the return for a
package is the principal-weighted average of these returns across all
trades in the package.
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Note for Table VIII
degression estimates of the model,
3 6 36
j^i j-i 3.1
where r,- is the return (in %) from: the opening price on the package's
first day to the closing price on the package's last day; the closing
price one day after, to the closing price five days after, the package's
last day; the opening price on the package's first day to the package;
the package to the closing price one day after the package's last day;
the package to the closing priced five days after the package's last
day. All returns are in excess of the buy-and-hold return on a matching
size decile control portfolio over the corresponding interval. Cs is
the dollar commission cost; S-- is a dummy variable for the package's
classification by market capitalization; D-- is a dummy variable for the
package's classification by complexity; M- • is a dummy variable for the
money manager. The equation is estimated separately for buys and for
sells. The sample comprises all trades of NYSE and Amex stocks by 37
institutional money management firms from July 1, 1986 to December 30,
1988 (excluding October 1987). A buy (sell) package in a stock is a
case where the same money management firm executed successive purchases
(sales) of the same stock, with a break of less than 5 days between
successive trades. There are five classifications by market
capitalization, corresponding to the guintiles of the distribution of
value of outstanding equity at the end of the prior quarter for all NYSE
and Amex stocks. There are seven classifications by trade complexity,
corresponding to the 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th and 99th percentiles
of the distribution within each size category of package principal value
in relation to average daily volume over a prior 40-day period.
Table IX
Average round-trip principal-weighted returns (in percent)
of money management firms, classified by
investment style (panel A) ; by portfolio turnover
rate (panel B); by package length (panel C)
In panels A and B, the sample comprises all trades of NYSE and Amex stocks by 16 institutional
money management firms from July 1, 1986 to December 30, 1988 (excluding October 1987); in
panel C the sample comprises all trades by the full set of 37 institutional money management
firms. A buy (sell) package in a stock is a case where the same money management firm execute
successive purchases (sales) of the same stock, with a break of less than 5 days between
successive trades. Round-trip returns are the returns for buy packages minus the return on
sell packages. Returns are in excess of the buy-and-hold returns on a matching size decile
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